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Abstract
We introduce an efficient and dynamic resource allocation mechanism within the frame-
work of a cooperative game with fuzzy coalitions. A fuzzy coalition in a resource allocation
problem can be so defined that membership grades of the players in it, are proportional to
the fractions of their total resources. We call any distribution of the resources possessed by
the players, among a prescribed number of coalitions, a fuzzy coalition structure and every
membership grade (equivalently fraction of the total resource), a resource investment. It is
shown that this resource investment is influenced by satisfaction of the players in regards to
better performance under a cooperative setup. Our model is based on the real life situations,
where possibly one or more players compromise on their resource investments in order to help
forming a coalition.
AMS Subject Classifications[2000]: 91A12, 91A99,03E72
Keywords: fuzzy coalitions; rational player; exact resource allocation; cooperative game.
1 Introduction
Theory of cooperative games, since its inception by Neumann and Morgenstern [30] in 1953, has
been successfully explaining many complex decision making situations. Physically, the idea re-
volves around situations where self interested players- representing companies or individuals can
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achieve more by forming coalitions than participating individually. Here, humane characteristics
viz: players’ satisfaction, efficiency, conflicts, capacity to work in a group or as individuals etc.
have so far been given little consideration. Nevertheless, it is observed that those factors con-
tribute to a great deal of effecting the output of a joint endeavor. It is further interesting to note
that, satisfaction is an intrinsic ingredient to all those factors.(Interested reader may look at [6],
where we have developed a model to show how satisfaction of players can be incorporated in payoff
allocation).
In this paper, we have considered the problem of obtaining a suitable resource investment
allocation matrix (fuzzy coalition structure) in an n-person cooperative game with fuzzy coali-
tions. The goal of our study is to provide a systematic treatment of satisfaction level as a basis
for negotiation among rational agents, capable of participating in different fuzzy coalitions with
possibly varied rate of memberships simultaneously. The negotiation among the players, is carried
out through a consensus mediator. We assume that the worth of (or profit from) a fuzzy coalition
is evolved dynamically as opposed to its static behavior considered in most of the literature so far.
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of players or agents. Any subset of N is called a crisp coalition. In
a crisp coalition, participation of a player is full or nil i.e. either a player invests her full resource
(or puts her full power) to a coalition or she does not give it at all. The set of all crisp coalitions
of N is denoted by 2N . A cooperative game is defined as a real valued function v : 2N → R+∪{0}
such that v(∅) = 0. For each crisp coalition c ∈ 2N the real number v(c) is known as the worth of
the coalition c (or profit incurred from c). However, if a player, with her resource (or power) in
hand, wants to participate in various coalitions simultaneously, it would be practically impossible
for her to provide full resource(power) to all of them. This leads to the notion of fuzzy coalitions
and fuzzy coalition structures. A fuzzy coalition is defined as a fuzzy set of N , and represented
by an n-tuple, where its ith component represents the degree of participation (or fraction of the
resource) of player i in it. Thus a fuzzy coalition is formed when the participating players invest
fractions of their total resources. Resource investment can therefore be made synonymous with the
formation of a fuzzy coalition. Similarly a fuzzy coalition structure may be defined as a resource
investment matrix, in which the (i, j)th entry represents the fraction of resource of the ith player
in the jth fuzzy coalition. Formally, a fuzzy coalition structure is a class of fuzzy coalitions formed
simultaneously by the players providing their partial participations. Therefore, from a player’s
perspective, fuzzy coalitions (in a fuzzy coalition structure) may be termed as “investment av-
enues”. Aubin[1], Butnariu[8], Branzei et al. [7] contributed to a great deal of the theory of fuzzy
cooperative games and thereby justified the fuzzification in terms of the players’ participation in
a coalition. In both crisp or fuzzy environment, the challenge in the study of cooperative games
rests in finding a suitable resource investment matrix for the players and a suitable distribution
of the worth or profit to its players thereafter. Shapley values, core, minimum norm solutions,
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compromise values etc. are some of the solution concepts hitherto found in the literature those
deal with distribution of worth [1, 8, 20, 21, 22, 29, 7].
In [6], we have mentioned that behavioral psychologists often advocate for various means for
ensuring collective and efficient coordination among the agents/players. It is seen that, satisfac-
tion of the participating players, as an efficient mean, can enhance the overall performance of a
coalitional activity. It has the ability to increase the worth of (profit from) a coalition by encour-
aging group performance so that the players would end up with getting more from it. Moreover,
all players in a cooperative game do not possess capacities at par(by capacity, here, we mean a
quantification of the resources owned by a player). Therefore, satisfaction of a player in forming a
coalition is indicative of her capacity in terms of her resources. When a coalition is formed with a
fraction of the player’s resource, it would be a matter of her primary concern to notice whether she
is satisfied with it, up to a desired level. Moreover, players with fractional resources and multiple
assignments usually find it difficult to put their efforts individually in a single assignment and
rather would search for some companions to form a coalition. For them, it is somewhat beneficial
to compromise with the resources they provide for the sake of forming a coalition. Furthermore,
players’ investment preferences, if allowed to choose of their own, range from getting involved in
a large number of coalitions with smaller rates of participations (small fragments of resources) to
accumulating them for a fewer ones. In game theoretic terminologies, this means that some play-
ers are inclined to have a large number of fuzzy coalitions with smaller membership grades, while
others like fewer ones with larger membership grades. This idea is well explained by the notion of
risk analysis in investment problems, where the members in the former group of investors (players)
are less interested in taking risk (return is small but probability is high) and the later ones are
risk takers (return may be large but probability is small). Therefore, negotiation and compromise
among the players in forming coalitions is highly relevant in a cooperative game theoretic setup.
This motivates us to model a mediator imposed identification of an efficient allocation of resource
investments for our game. Existing literature, to the best of our knowledge, has not considered
such inter-coalitional strategies in regards to forming a coalition structure.
In what follows, formation of coalition for cooperative games is broadly divided into two cate-
gories, namely static and dynamic. The static coalitions do not, in general reflect the cooperations
among the players explicitly. In crisp cooperative games, Dieckmann et al[11], Ray et al[25, 26, 27]
have contributed a lot to the dynamic coalition formation. However, in fuzzy environment,a lit-
tle work has been carried out in this direction. In [4, 5, 6], some mathematical models (both
probabilistic and deterministic) are proposed for allocation of payoffs among the players assuming
that each provides the membership value of satisfaction upon receiving a proposal offered by a
mediator.
As already mentioned, along with a dynamic payoff allocation procedure among the members
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of a fuzzy coalition, it is equally (or at least not less) important to devise a mechanism in allo-
cating resource investments of players in different coalitions to form a fuzzy coalition structure.
For a meaningful coalition, the members need to be supportive to one another. However, every
player desires to invest more to gain more. Therefore, it is natural to expect all the players to be
satisfied at par with a resource investment allocation matrix in a cooperative environment. Thus
an aggregated satisfaction value over a particular resource investment allocation to an individual
player within the coalition can be derived to meet the requirements. A solution in this paradigm
should be such that every player is almost equally satisfied with it.
An example
The state of Assam in India has been known to the world by her tea industries and other natural
resources such as coal, petroleum, limestones etc. It is the home to the world famous one horn
rhinoceros. The Kaziranga National Park has been declared a world heritage site by the UNESCO
for providing natural shelter to the one horn rhinoceros. The area lies in the terrain of Himalayan
range on the north and eastern side and the Barail range on the south and western part. The region
attracts many migratory birds during the winter. A number of tourists flock to the various tourist
places scattered in the region, however the tourism industry is still in the neonatal stage. There
is little government initiatives and therefore, scope of initiations by private firms towards tourism
industry is enormous. Tea industry in the state, on the other hand, has witnessed a paradigm shift
from big corporate houses functioning from outside the state to the small tea growers, who are
mainly local enthusiasts. However, it is observed that the small tea planters (who do not have tea
factories) are not getting proper value of their raw products (green tea) due to the dominance of
big tea industries (who have tea factories). Furthermore, the region is equally famous for its wide
varieties of flora and fauna. Hundreds of species of wild Orchids are found in the nearby forests.
Mass level cultivation of orchids can also be a promising industry in the state. Nevertheless, most
of these ventures get disturbed by occasional as well as frequently occurring natural and man made
hazards. As the area is influenced by a number of subtropical phenomena, such as heavy rainfall,
flood, landslides along with other natural and man made disasters like earthquakes, insurgency
and social unrest etc., it is more natural to put resources in different endeavours (to form fuzzy
coalitions) by distributing risk of loss and carry out the tasks all together rather than sticking to
a particular industry. Suppose, three persons P1 , P2 and P3 together took a collective decision
to-
(a) set up a tea factory for the small tea planters of the area.
(b) cultivate orchids on commercial basis in order to cater to the needs of the local and global
markets.
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(c) set up an agency for venturing organized tourism in the area including tea tourism.
It is important to note that all the above three possible enterprises have interlinks, so that
each is expected to grow hand in hand along with the remaining two. We may further assume
that the players are unevenly skilled to these three endeavors. They finally have to submit their
proposals to the concerned departments of the state government(Department of Industry, Tourism
and Agriculture etc.) for necessary approval and other legalities. The problem now rests on how
much resource of each player can be judiciously allocated to each such enterprise so that the total
resource is exhausted. In game theoretic terminology, this would resort to finding that how we
can make three simultaneous fuzzy coalitions with the membership grades provided by the three
players. Ordinary static solution concepts can be employed to have one, nevertheless for creating
a better work environment producing optimum synergy, we may incorporate the satisfaction levels
of each of the players in the solution searching procedure as mentioned above.
The two fold allocation process
Initially all the players would inform the mediator about their available resources for investment
and would jointly fix a number of possible coalitions for the game. Consequently the players
would announce the total resources for each coalition to work with. Indeed each coalition can
have different resource options (depending on the same announced by the players) with different
levels of risk. We accept that the risk level of a coalition to work with large resource is less than the
one with small resource. The mediator will then find the optimal fuzzy coalition structure and the
corresponding optimal total resource allocation in such a way that the sum of the total resources
allocated for all coalitions is equal to the total resource in her hand. The resource allocations at
each coalition for the optimal coalition structure is then offered by the mediator. Upon receiving
such proposal, the players will provide their degrees of satisfactions in each coalition according to
their inherent satisfaction functions. Hereafter, we call this as “investment satisfaction” as the
fraction of resources of a player to be allocated to a fuzzy coalition refers to her investments in the
coalition. On the basis of this information the mediator will update her belief and propose the next
resource allocations and the process continues until a stopping condition is met. Thus the mediator
would offer successive proposals of resource allocations to the players judging on their reactions to
the previous offers. We have developed a stopping rule and proposed the process of updating the
belief of the mediator by use of a suitable function towards the possible reactions of the players
upon different offers of resource allocations. We call this function the approximate investment
satisfaction function. Furthermore, a variance function is defined to measure the closeness among
the investment satisfaction levels of the individual players in a coalition over a single proposal.
Variance would determine acceptability of a particular resource investment allocation. If the
variance of the investment satisfactions associated with a resource investment allocation (possibly
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with an abuse of terminology, we can call this as the variance of a resource investment allocation) is
below certain threshold to be determined by all the players collectively, then it would be considered
as a possible trade-off resource investment allocation to the problem. When the variance becomes
static at some stage and is still greater than the threshold, the corresponding resource investment
allocation will be accepted as an optimal resource investment allocation. Our method is based
on the assumption that the mediator proposes successive resource investment allocations with
variance getting smaller at every successive stage while keeping the following two conditions in
mind throughout the negotiation process:
(a) there should exist at least one coalition where investment satisfaction of a player is greater
than the aggregated investment satisfaction of all players in that coalition
(b) there should exist at least one coalition where investment satisfaction of a player is less than
the aggregated investment satisfaction of all players in that coalition.
A mathematical expression of the above two conditions is provided in the beginning of subsection
3.1.2.
An exact resource investment allocation is one for which variance is zero. Thus, for an exact
resource investment allocation, all the investment satisfactions are equal. We will show that
under conditions (a) and (b), the negotiation process converges to an exact resource investment
allocation. In general, every player keeps her investment satisfaction function secret from the
others. If a player discloses it before negotiation, we say that she facilitates “arbitration” by
providing incentives to the others. The negotiation strategy is so designed that the mediator
would propose only offers for which the variance would be minimum at each stage of the negotiation
process. What we have also kept in mind is that, in the negotiation process, each of the players
has a single motive: maximizing her individual payoffs by investing maximum of her resources.
This is well represented by some monotonic increasing functions characterizing the fuzzy sets of
their satisfactions. However, negotiation appeals a player to accommodate the desires and views
of all the other players. This suggests that an appropriate negotiation process should discourage
the players from insisting on illogical and abnormal coalition structures while it should reward
those who are more open in forming coalitions.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the preliminary
ideas required to formulate our model. In section 3, we develop the theoretical background of
our model and prove the existence of a better efficient offer. An iterative method for obtaining a
coalition structure for the n-person cooperative game with fuzzy coalitions is also described here.
Examples pertaining to the model and the existence of optimal resource investment allocation are
presented in section 4. Section 5 includes the concluding remarks.
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2 Preliminaries
This section reviews the concept of a cooperative game with fuzzy coalitions and the related
properties. A fuzzy set is characterized by a membership function from the universal set to [0, 1].
Thus, without loss of generality, we denote the fuzzy sets here by their membership functions.
We consider the class of fuzzy games defined by Azrieli and Lehrer [2]. This class seems to be
more general than the other existing classes and includes the class of crisp games as a subclass.
Its interpretation, however, is rather different. A fuzzy subset of a crisp set X is a function from
X to [0, 1], assigning every element of X a membership between 0 and 1. Let N be a finite set
representing the types of agents in a large population. There is a continuum of agents of each
type and Qi ≥ 0 is the size of type i (i = 1, 2, ..., n) agents. The entire population is, therefore,
represented by a non negative vector Q = (Q1, ..., Qn), and possible coalitions are identified with
the vectors that are (coordinate-wise) smaller than Q. By what is called an abuse of notation we
shall represent the sum
∑n
i=1Qi by Q here.
Thus formalizing the notion, we have the following:
For every non-negative vector Q ∈ Rn, let F (Q) be the box given by
F (Q) = {x ∈ Rn : 0 ≤ x ≤ Q} .
The point Q is interpreted as the “grand coalition” in fuzzy sense, and every x ∈ F (Q) is a
possible fuzzy coalition while 0 ∈ F (Q) is the zero vector signifying 0-size of all types of players.
For every Q ≥ 0 : Q ∈ Rn, a cooperative fuzzy game is a pair (Q, v) such that
(i) Q ∈ Rn and Q ≥ 0.
(ii) v : F (Q)→ R+ ∪ 0 is bounded and satisfies v(0) = 0.
Thus if xi represents the amount of agents of type i (i = 1, 2, ..., n) that participate in a coalition
x, then the total profit from x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) is given by the real number v(x)[see [2] for more
details]. Thus the worth of a fuzzy coalition is identified with the profit it incurs due to its
formation.
This model has another interpretation due to Azrieli et al [2]. Assume that for every i (i =
1, 2, 3, ..., n), the amount of resources available for agent i is Qi ≥ 0 (this can be time, money, etc.).
Each agent can choose to invest any fraction of his resources xi ≤ Qi in a joint project. Note that
a fuzzy coalition in Aubin’s [1] sense is given by a membership function from N to [0, 1], however
the two approaches are equivalent in the following sense:
If for every x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) ∈ F (Q), xi (0 ≤ xi ≤ Qi) is the amount of resources that agent i
invests, then we can uniquely define a function SQx : N → [0, 1] as follows
SQx (i) =

xi
Qi
if Qi 6= 0 and xi 6= 0
0 otherwise
(1)
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The function SQx can be interpreted as the membership function for a possible fuzzy coalition
in Aubin’s sense pertaining to x in F (Q). Thus under this interpretation, every x ∈ F (Q)
corresponds to a unique fuzzy coalition SQx in membership function form and vice versa. The
support of x denoted by Supp( x) is the set {i ∈ N | xi > 0}. Note that F (Q) is a lattice under
ordinary inclusion of fuzzy sets. Let us denote respectively by ∨ and ∧, the maximum and minimum
operators in F (Q). A fuzzy game (Q, v) is said to be superadditive if v(x ∨ y) ≥ v(x) + v(y)
for every x,y ∈ F (Q) : x ∧ y = 0. Let us denote by GF (Q), the class of superadditive
cooperative fuzzy games with respect to a grand coalition Q. Hereafter, we shall consider the
members of GF (Q) only for our study and to simplify our notations, denote by v , any member
(Q, v) ∈ GF (Q). The following are few important excerpts from our previous paper [6] for a ready
reference:
Definition 1. A vector of payoffs y = (y1, y2, ..., yn) ∈ Rn, one for each player is called a profit
allocation. A profit allocation y is efficient for coalition x ∈ F (Q) if ∑ni=1 yi = v(x).
Definition 2. The minimum deal index of a fuzzy game v ∈ GF (Q) with respect to a fuzzy
coalition x is the vector y(i,x) ∈ Rn such that
y(i,x) =
 v(xi) +
xi∑
xi
[v(x)−∑i v(xi)] if i ∈ Supp x
0 otherwise
(2)
where xi = (0, ...0, xi, 0, ...0) ∈ F (Q), and v(x).xi may be interpreted as the proportion of
resource of the ith component in v(x).
Remark 1. The minimum deal index is an efficient allocation.
Note that if the cooperative game v : Rn → R+ ∪ {0} is continuous and all the resources of
the players are of same kind, then v depends on the total resource Q of the coalition s, rather
on different distributions, i.e. v is constant on each set {(x1, x2, ..., xn) :
∑n
i=1 xi = Q} for each
Q ∈ R. For example if resources are considered in monetary units, then v being symmetric in all
variables, generates a unique function F : R → R+ ∪ {0} such that v = FoS, where S : Rn → R
defined for every x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) ∈ Rn, by S(x) =
∑n
i=1 xi. Therefore, F and v can be
used alternatively in finding the optimal fuzzy coalition structure {s1, s2, ...sm} such that their
resource allocation vector (Q1, Q2, ...Qm) maximizes
∑m
i=1 v(Qj). We illustrate this by means of
the following example:
Example 1. Take a cooperative fuzzy game v with 3 players, where v : R3 → R is defined as
v(x1, x2, x3) =
(x1+x2+x3)
2
9 . Here v is symmetric with respect to x1,x2 and x3. Hence we can find
the function F : R→ R+ ∪ {0} by F (x) = x29 , such that v = FoS, where S : Rn → R is the sum
function given by S(x1, x2, x3) =
∑3
i=1 xi.
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3 Our Model
Here we assume that only a finite number of fuzzy coalitions (where resource will be invested)
exists for finite number of players. This may be the case when the resources are measured in finite
denominations or when arbitrarily small fractions of resources have no practical utility. At first
all players i = 1, 2, ..., n would submit their available resources R1 ,R2 , ... , Rn to the mediator
which, she will allocate in the fuzzy coalitions. Let m be the maximum possible size of the fuzzy
coalition structure to be accrued by the players in presence of the mediator. Each player i would
estimate the total budget for each of them coalitions . We assume that for the jth coalition sj , the
total budget vector estimated by the players be (Qj1, Qj2, ..., Qjn). We further assume that sj can
work with budget aj = min{Qj1, Qj2, ..., Qjn} at high risk while with bj = max{Qj1, Qj2, ..., Qjn}
at low risk. This assumption is due to the fact that each coalition requires a sufficient amount
of budgets to work with and we can expect that risk level will vary according to the investment.
Let the set of possible coalitions be s = {s1, s2, ..., sm}. The mediator will then find an optimal
coalition structure s∗ = {s1, s2, ..., sm∗} and a corresponding budget vector (Q1, Q2, ..., Qm∗) such
that (with regards to the cooperative game v),
∑m∗
j=1 v(Qj) is maximum and
∑m∗
j=1Qj = Q. This
task would be performed in the following three steps:
Step 1: Find all the regions of the form {aj ≤ Qj ≤ bj , j = 1, 2, ...,m′}, where m′ ≤ n and∑m′
j=1 aj ≤
∑n
i=1Ri ≤
∑m′
j=1 bj .
Step 2: Solve the following problem for each region obtained in Step 1,
arg(Q1,Q2,...Qm′ )
max
 m′∑
j=1
v(Qj) : aj ≤ Qj ≤ bj
 . (3)
Step 3: Select those solutions (Q1, Q2, ...Qm∗) obtained in Step 2 , for which
∑m∗
j=1 v(Qj) is max-
imum.
Let (Q∗1, Q
∗
2, ...Q
∗
m∗) be one such solution and s∗ = (s1, s2, ...sm∗), the corresponding coalition
structure. To illustrate this process, let us take the same cooperative fuzzy game v considered in
example 1.
Example 2. Let the budgets of the players submitted be R1 = 5, R2 = 10, R3 = 15 units
respectively. The players accept that there must be at the most five possible coalitions s1, s2, s3,
s4 and s5. Let their announced expected total budgets for those coalitions be given by the matrix:
Q = [Qij ] =

3 4 5
2 3 4
4 5 7
6 9 10
15 17 20

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Therefore, a1 = 3, b1 = 5, a2 = 2, b2 = 4, a3 = 4, b3 = 7, a4 = 6, b4 = 10, a5 = 15, b5 = 20.
Step 1: Here the mediator finds the regions
{aj ≤ Qj ≤ bj , j = 1, 2, ...,m′}, where m′ ≤ 3 and
∑m′
j=1 aj ≤
∑n
i=1Ri ≤
∑m′
j=1 bj .
Accordingly, she obtains the following :
region 1 : {3 ≤ Q1 ≤ 5, 6 ≤ Q4 ≤ 10, 15 ≤ Q5 ≤ 20}
region 2 : {2 ≤ Q2 ≤ 5, 4 ≤ Q3 ≤ 7, 15 ≤ Q5 ≤ 20}
region 3 : {3 ≤ Q1 ≤ 5, 4 ≤ Q3 ≤ 7, 15 ≤ Q5 ≤ 20}
region 4 : {2 ≤ Q2 ≤ 4, 6 ≤ Q4 ≤ 10, 15 ≤ Q5 ≤ 20}
region 5 : {4 ≤ Q3 ≤ 7, 6 ≤ Q4 ≤ 10, 15 ≤ Q5 ≤ 20}
region 6 : {6 ≤ Q4 ≤ 10, 15 ≤ Q5 ≤ 20}
Step 2: The mediator solves the optimization problem
arg(Q1,Q2,...Qm′ )
max
 m′∑
j=1
v(Qj) : aj ≤ Qj ≤ bj

for each region obtained in Step 1 as follows,
(a) for region 1, she obtains one of the solutions as (Q1 = 3, Q4 = 7, Q5 = 20) for which v(Q1) +
v(Q4) + v(Q5) = 50.8889.
(b) for region 2, she obtains one of the solutions as (Q2 = 3, Q3 = 7, Q5 = 20) for which v(Q2) +
v(Q3) + v(Q5) = 50.8889.
(c) for region 3, she obtains one of the solutions as (Q1 = 3, Q3 = 7, Q5 = 20) for which v(Q1) +
v(Q3) + v(Q5) = 50.8889.
(d) for region 4, one of the solutions would be (Q2 = 2, Q4 = 8, Q5 = 20) for which v(Q2)+v(Q4)+
v(Q5)) = 52.
(e) for region 5, one of the solutions would be (Q3 = 4, Q4 = 6, Q5 = 20) for which v(Q3)+v(Q4)+
v(Q5) = 50.2222.
(f) for region 6, one of the solutions would be (Q4 = 10, Q5 = 20) for which v(Q4) + v(Q5) =
55.5556.
Step 3: Thus, in this step, from the above solutions, the mediator picks up those solutions
for which
∑
v(Qj) is maximum. Here (Q4 = 10, Q5 = 20) gives the maximum value as v(Q4) +
v(Q5)) = 55.5556. So, the optimal coalition structure is {s4, s5} and the corresponding budget
vector is (Q4 = 10, Q5 = 20).
Once an optimal coalition structure s∗ = (s1, s2, ..., sm∗) is evolved, the mediator would initiate
for the resource allocation process to these coalitions. A resource investment allocation matrix
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x = (xij)
n,m∗
i=1,j=1 is one whose rows and columns signify respectively, the number of players and the
number of fuzzy coalitions (investment avenues) as decided by the mediator and the (i, j)th entry
xij represents the fraction of the ith player’s resource, allocated for investment in the jth coalition.
Moreover, a resource investment allocation matrix x can be expressed as an array (x1, · · · ,xm∗)
of column vectors, where each xj is a fuzzy coalition (i.e xj ∈ F (Q), 1 ≤ j ≤ m∗). Here after we
call a “resource investment allocation matrix” as “resource allocation” in short. Let xij be the
fraction of resource offered by player i for v in the jth coalition from her total resource Ri. Hence,
we must have Ri =
∑m∗
j=1 xij .
In our model, we associate a satisfaction function of player i for its resource allocation in the jth
coalition and call it the ”Investment satisfaction function” denoted by ISij : R→ [0, 1]. We accept
the following assumptions with regards to the investment satisfaction function:
Assumption (1) ISij(v)(x) = 0 , when x ≤ 0.
Assumption (2) ISij(v)(x) = 1, when x ≥ Ri.
Assumption (3) ISij(v) is continuously differentiable and also strictly monotonic increasing in
[0, Ri].
A possible physical significance of the above assumptions is that each player i is keen to invest
her whole resource (Ri). Her degree of satisfaction is therefore zero if she has no investment at
all and one if she has full investment there. Moreover, it is natural to expect that satisfaction of
any player increases continuously with respect to her investment. Furthermore, every player tries
to increase her resource investment in a coalition. So, the derivatives of investment satisfaction
functions are monotonic increasing.
Thus to summarize, a “resource allocation” x = (xij)
n,m∗
i=1,j=1 to a cooperative fuzzy game v is a
distribution of resources of the players among all fuzzy coalitions such that
∑m∗
ji=1 xij = Ri and∑n
i=1 xij = Qj . Following definitions are important.
Definition 3. A resource allocation x = (xij)
n,m∗
i=1,j=1 is said to be an exact resource allocation if
all the players in a fuzzy coalition are equally satisfied with their resource investments i.e. ∃λj ∈ R
with j = 1, 2, ...,m∗ such that ISij(v)(xij) = λj , i = 1, 2, ...n.
Definition 4. A resource allocation x = (xij)
n,m∗
i=1,j=1 is said to be an approximate resource
allocation if there exist at least two players i, k(i 6= k), ISij(v)(xij) 6= ISkj (v)(xkj) for some
j : 1 ≤ j ≤ m∗.
In order to obtain a better resource allocation from the previous one, we define the variance
function as follows:
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Definition 5. The function var : Rn × Rm∗ → R, given by
var(x) =
√√√√m∗∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
(
ISij(v)(xij)− ISv(xj)
)2
(4)
is called the variance function of the resource allocation x = (xij)
n,m∗
i=1,j=1, where, ISv(xj) =∑n
i=1 IS
i
j(v)(xij)
n
is the mean satisfaction of the players over the jth coalition.
Definition 6. A resource allocation x′ = (x′ij)
n,m∗
i=1,j=1 is said to be better approximate resource
allocation than the resource allocation x = (xij)
n,m∗
i=1,j=1 if var(x
′) < var(x).
Note that every resource allocation is Pareto Optimal in the sense that a betterment to a single
player in the next stage is not possible without decreasing the amount of resource to at least one
of the remaining players in each coalition.
3.1 Allocation Strategies
The process of negotiation is governed by the negotiation strategies adopted by the mediator for
an equitable benefit of each of the players. These strategies determine how the mediator generates
and consequently how the players evaluate resource investment to reach an agreement that is
most in their self interest [15]. The mediator would propose resource allocation throughout the
negotiation process. Whenever a resource allocation is not accepted by the players with equal
satisfactions within a coalition, she would either adopt a trade-off strategy or make further offers
using an exact resource allocation searching strategy.
3.1.1 Trade-off strategy
A trade-off strategy is an approach by which the mediator generates a resource allocation without
reducing the corresponding aggregated satisfaction value. Here, if the variance is below or equal to
certain collectively accepted threshold, the players would agree to the current resource allocation
instead of continuing the process further. Thus by this approach, one can search for an agreement
that benefits all the players at an acceptable threshold.
Suppose that, Si(xt) = {xtj ∈ F (Q) : ISij(v)(xtij) > ISv(xti)} , S′i(xt) = {xtj ∈ F (Q) :
ISij(v)(x
t
ij) < ISv(xtj)} and S′′i (xt) = {xtj ∈ F (Q) : ISij(v)(xtij) = ISv(xtj)} for every i, represent
respectively, the sets of all coalitions in which the investment satisfaction degrees of i exceed the
aggregated investment satisfaction value, the investment satisfaction degrees precede the aggre-
gated investment satisfaction value and finally the set of all coalitions in which the investment
satisfaction degrees of i are equal to the aggregated value at stage t. If either Sti or S
′t
i is empty,
the mediator adopts a trade-off strategy. If both Sti and S
′t
i are non-empty, at each stage t, an
exact resource allocation searching strategy will be adopted as described in the following.
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3.1.2 Exact allocation searching strategy
Let at stage t+1, the proposed allocation be xt = (xtij) and Si(x
t) 6= ∅ and S′i(xt) 6= ∅. As already
mentioned that the mediator is unaware of the investment satisfaction functions of the players, she
would update her belief on each player at each stage by assessing the lower and upper bounds of
the satisfactions. At stage t of the negotiation process, we obtain these bounds for player i ∈ N in
the coalition xtj by defining an approximate function namely µ
t
ij . This function is indeed a linear
approximation (from below) of player i’s actual investment satisfaction function for the next offer
at stage t + 1 and is obtained by joining the pair
[
(0, 0) , (xtij , IS
i
j(v)(x
t
ij))
]
of points. Thus we
have,
µtij (x) =
ISij(v)
(
xtij
)
xtij
x, ∀i ∈ N, 1 ≤ j ≤ m∗ (5)
The idea of searching for the exact resource allocation depends on how every investment satisfac-
tion ISij(v)(x
t
ij) for the player i in the coalition x
t
j at stage t converges to the mean investment
satisfaction ISv(xtj). So, at stage t, for obtaining the bounds of the actual investment satisfaction
degree of player i, towards a resource allocation, to be proposed in the next stage t+ 1, we need
to find those values of z ∈ R for which µtij(z) = ISv(xtj) . We shall denote these values by either
atij or b
t
ij keeping in mind that if z is denoted by a
t
ij then x
t
ij = b
t
ij and if z is denoted by b
t
ij then
xtij = a
t
ij . A geometric representation of the idea is shown in figure 1 and 2.
Thus atij and b
t
ij for x
t
j in Si(x
t) , S′i(x
t) and S′′i (x
t) are given separately by,
atij = ISv(xtj)×
xtij
ISij(v)(x
t
ij)
and btij = x
t
ij . (6)
where xtj ∈ Si(xt). Similarly for xtj ∈ S′i(xt), we have,
atij = x
t
ij and b
t
ij = ISv(xtj)×
xtij
ISij(v)(x
t
ij)
. (7)
Finally, we have, for xtj ∈ S′′i (xt),
atij = x
t
ij and b
t
ij = x
t
ij .
Thus the expected proposal x∗, is defined as follows:
Definition 7. Assuming that the mediator puts a resource allocation xt to the players at stage t
and that all the players subsequently announce their investment satisfaction degrees, the expected
better resource allocation x∗ for the proposal at stage t+ 1 is defined as :
x∗ = argx
min
√√√√√√
m∗∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
i<k
k∈N
(
µtij (xij)− µtkj (xkj)
)2
: A
 (8)
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where
A :=

n∑
i=1
xij = Qj ,
m∗∑
j=1
xij = Ri, atij ≤ xij ≤ btij , i = 1, 2, ...n, j = 1, 2, ...,m∗
 .
Note that, if at stage t + 1, the proposed allocation x = (xij)
n,m∗
i=1,j=1 be such that for some
player i either Si(xt) = φ or S′i(x
t) = φ, then the mediator would seek for a resource allocation
xt+1 which minimizes
var(x) =
√√√√m∗∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
(
ISij(v)(xij)− ISv(xj)
)2
(9)
Let D denote the mutually accepted trade-off threshold to a proposal x, at some stage. Then
if var(x) ≤ D, the mediator would resort to a trade-off strategy and we call the corresponding
allocation x an optimal resource allocation.
3.2 The Negotiation Process
In our model, we take a combination of the two allocation strategies to carry out the process of
negotiations. Thus, what follows is:
The mediator offers resource allocation at stage t = 0 and expects that it is the exact resource
allocation. If it is so, the process terminates and we get the required resource allocation. If not, she
would check for non-emptiness of the sets Si(xt) and S′i(x
t) for every i ∈ N . If there exist at least
one player for which either of them is empty, then the mediator will pickup the trade-off strategy.
If there is no trade-off among players, the process would terminate with conflicts. Otherwise,
the mediator would adopt the exact resource allocation searching strategy and obtain the upper
and lower bounds of the next investment satisfaction degrees of all the players. Subsequently, she
approximates the investment satisfaction function possessed by player i, at stage t for stage t+1 by
µtij which is a linear approximation of the investment satisfaction function IS
i
j(v) for the next offer
from below the aggregated investment satisfaction degree. Thus a better approximate resource
allocation (due to the approximate investment satisfaction) would be obtained and announced as
the next offer.
The following lemma is important:
Lemma 1. Let the resource allocation at the stage t be xt =
(
xtij
)
, such that for every player i,
Si(xt) 6= φ and S′i(xt) 6= φ. If the corresponding degrees of investment satisfactions given by the
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players are ISij(v)(x
t
ij), then we must have∑
xtij∈Si(xt)
xtij >
∑
xtij∈Si(xt)
ISv
(
xtj
)× xtij
ISij(v)
(
xtij
) (10)
∑
xtij∈S′i(xt)
ISv
(
xtj
)× xtij
ISij(v)
(
xtij
) > ∑
xtij∈S′i(xt)
xtij (11)
∑
i∈Sj(xt)
xtij >
∑
i∈Sj(xt
ISv
(
xtj
)× xtij
ISij(v)
(
xtij
) (12)
and
∑
i∈S′j(xt)
ISv
(
xtj
)× xtij
ISij(v)
(
xtij
) > ∑
i∈S′j(xt)
xtij (13)
where Sj(xt) = {i ∈ N : ISij(v)(xtij) > ISv(xtj)} and S′j(xt) = {i ∈ N : ISij(v)(xtij) < ISv(xtj)}
represent respectively, the sets of players having satisfaction degrees above and below the aggregated
satisfaction for the resource allocation xt at stage t.
Remark 2. A similar lemma was proved in our previous paper (Lemma 11, [6]) concerning profit
allocation. The proof of lemma 1 goes exactly in the same way and thus we omit the same here.
Theorem 1. Given a superadditive cooperative fuzzy game v : F (Q) → R+ ∪ {0} and a rational
efficient resource allocation xt at stage t which is not exact, let us assume that Si(xt) 6= φ and
S′i(x
t) 6= φ for all player i. Then for stage t+ 1, there exists at least one better rational efficient
resource allocation xt+1, such that
atij ≤ xt+1ij ≤ btij .
for xtj ∈ Si(xt) where atij and btij are given by equation (6) and
atij ≤ xt+1ij ≤ btij .
for xtj ∈ S′i(xt) where atij and btij are given by equation (7)
Proof. Here, we have to prove that there exists a rational efficient resource allocation which is
better than the given resource allocation.
Part I: (Existence of a Rational efficient resource allocation)
For the existence of a rational efficient resource allocation x = (xij)
n,m∗
i=1,j=1 at stage t+1, we need
to show that,∑m∗
j=1 a
t
ij ≤
∑m∗
j=1 xij = Ri ≤
∑m∗
j=1 b
t
ij for all i = 1, 2, ..., n.
and
∑n
i=1 a
t
ij < Qj =
∑n
i=1 xij <
∑n
i=1 b
t
ij for all j = 1, 2, ...,m
∗
From first two inequalities of lemma 1, we have,
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∑
xtij∈Si(xt)
xtij >
∑
xtij∈Si(xt)
ISv
(
xtj
)× xtij
ISij(v)
(
xtij
) (14)
∑
xtij∈S′i(xt)
ISv
(
xtj
)× xtij
ISij(v)
(
xtij
) > ∑
xtij∈S′i(xt)
xtij (15)
Adding inequalities (14) and (15) with
∑
xtj∈S′′i (xt) x
t
ij on both sides, we get∑
xtj∈Si(xt)
atij +
∑
xtj∈S′i(xt)
xtij +
∑
xtj∈S′′i (xt)
xtij <
∑
xtj∈Si(xt)
xtij +
∑
xtj∈S′i(xt)
btij +
∑
xtj∈S′′i (xt)
xtij
Since, xtij = a
t
ij for x
t
j ∈ S′i(xt) ∪ S′′i (xt) and xtij = btij for xtj ∈ Si(xt) ∪ S′′i (xt), we have
m∗∑
j=1
atij <
m∗∑
j=1
xtij = Ri <
m∗∑
j=1
btij
for all i. Similarly, since, xtij = a
t
ij for i ∈ Sj(xt) ∪ S′′j (xt) and xtij = btij for i ∈ Sj(xt) ∪ S′′j (xt),
from the remaining two inequalities of lemma 1, we have,
m∗∑
j=1
atij <
n∑
i=1
xtij = Qj <
m∗∑
j=1
btij
for all xtj . Now, each investment satisfaction function IS
i
j(v) being continuous in the closed
interval
[
atij , b
t
ij
]
, and
∑n
i=1Ri =
∑m∗
j=1Qj we have, by the “Intermediate Value Theorem” that
there exists x = (xij)
n,m∗
i=1,j=1 such that a
t
ij ≤ xij ≤ btij for all i and j, along with
∑m∗
j=1 a
t
ij ≤∑m∗
j=1 xij = Ri ≤
∑m∗
j=1 b
t
ij for all i and
∑n
i=1 a
t
ij ≤
∑n
i=1 xij = Qj ≤
∑n
i=1 b
t
ij for each x
t
j .
Part II :(There is a new resource allocation better than the previous resource allocation)
Since for xtj ∈ Si(xt),
ISij(v)(x
t
ij) > ISv(xtj),
for xtj ∈ S′i(xt),
ISij(v)(x
t
ij) < ISv(xtj),
for i ∈ Sj(xt),
ISij(v)(x
t
ij) > ISv(xtj)
and for i ∈ S′j(xt),
ISij(v)(x
t
ij) < ISv(xtj),
by part I and using the following facts:
(i)
∑n
i=1Ri =
∑m∗
j=1Qj ,
(ii) for some player i, ISij(v)(xij) < IS
i
j(v)(x
t
ij) where x
t
j ∈ Si(xt), and finally,
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(iii) for some player i, ISij(v)(xij) > IS
i
j(v)(x
t
ij) where x
t
j ∈ S′i(xt),
we can select a resource allocation x = (xij)
n,m∗
i=1,j=1 such that,
(a) atij ≤ xij ≤ btij for all i and j,
(b)
∑m∗
j=1 a
t
ij ≤
∑m∗
j=1 xij = Ri ≤
∑m∗
j=1 b
t
ij for all i and,
(c)
∑n
i=1 a
t
ij ≤
∑n
i=1 xij = Qj ≤
∑n
i=1 b
t
ij for all j,
Since, for all player i, Si(xt) 6= φ and S′i(xt) 6= φ and since each investment satisfaction function
ISij(v) is continuous in the closed interval
[
atij , b
t
ij
]
, thus,
m∗∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
k∈N
i<k
(
ISij(v) (xij)− ISkj (v) (xkj)
)2
<
m∗∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
k∈N
i<k
(
ISij(v)
(
xtij
)− ISkj (v) (xtkj))2
⇒
m∗∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
k∈N
i<k
(
ISij(v) (xij)− ISv (xj)
)2
<
m∗∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
k∈N
i<k
(
ISij(v)
(
xtij
)− ISv (xtj))2
⇒ var (x) < var (xt) .
So, x = (xij)
n,m∗
i=1,j=1 is a better efficient resource allocation than x
t. This completes the proof.
3.2.1 The Negotiation Protocol
We now describe the negotiation protocol of the resource allocation process, accepting that an
optimal coalition structure s∗ = (s1, s2, ..., sm∗) has already evolved in the first phase.
Stage1:
The mediator will propose the initial resource allocation x0 = (x0ij)
n,m∗
i=1,j=1 where x
0
ij > 0 ∀i, j
and the players would react to this proposal by announcing their satisfaction degrees ISij(v)(x
0
ij).
Based on these information, the mediator would approximate her beliefs by defining the function
µ0ij as follows:(refer to equation (5))
µ0ij(x) =
ISij(v)(x
0
ij)
x0ij
x, ∀i ∈ N, j = 1, 2, ...,m∗ (16)
If the investment satisfactions ISij
(
x0ij
)
are equal in each coalition x0j =
(
x01j , x
0
2j , ..., x
0
nj
)
, 1 ≤
j ≤ m∗ , then the proposal x0 will be the exact resource allocation and the process would ter-
minate there itself. Otherwise, either for all players i, Si(x0) 6= φ and S′i(x0) 6= φ or for some
i one of Si(x0) or S′i(x
0) is empty. In the first situation the mediator would adopt “Exact re-
source allocation Searching Strategy” while the second situation will be dealt with a “Trade-off
strategy”. Existence of a better rational efficient resource allocation in the former case is ensured
by theorem 1. However, as the investment satisfaction functions of the players are not known a
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priori, the mediator computes the next resource allocation using only the approximate investment
satisfaction function µ0ij similar to that given in equation (8):
x1 = argx
min
√√√√√√
m∗∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
k∈N
i<k
(
µ0ij (xij)− µ0kj (xkj)
)2
: A

where,
A =

n∑
i=1
xij = Qj ,
m∗∑
j=1
xij = Ri, atij ≤ xij ≤ btij , j = 1, 2, ...,m∗, i = 1, 2, ...n
 .
such that,
a0ij = ISv(x0j ) ×
x0ij
ISij(v)(x
0
ij)
, b0ij = x
0
ij , for x
0
j ∈ Si(x0); a0ij = x0ij , b0ij = ISv(x0j ) ×
x0ij
ISij(v)(x
0
ij)
, for
x0j ∈ S′i(x0) ; and finally for x0j ∈ S′′i (x0), a0ij = x0ij and b0ij = x0ij .
Note that, here,
Si(x0) =
{
x0j ∈ F (Q) : ISij(v)(x0ij) > ISv(x0j )
}
, S′i(x
0) =
{
x0j ∈ F (Q) : ISij(v)(x0ij) < ISv(x0j )
}
and S′′i (x
0) =
{
x0j ∈ F (Q) : ISij(v)(x0ij) = ISv(x0j )
}
.
Stage t+1:
In the case of xt not being exact, whereas, for each i, Si(xt) 6= φ and S′i(xt) 6= φ, then by theorem 1
a better rational efficient resource allocation can be obtained as follows:
xt+1 = argx
min
√√√√√√
m∗∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
k∈N
i<k
(
µtij (xij)− µtkj (xkj)
)2
: A

where
A =

n∑
i=1
xij = Qj ,
m∗∑
j=1
xij = Ri, atij ≤ xij ≤ btij , j = 1, 2, ...,m∗, i = 1, 2, ...n
 .
and atij = ISv(xtj)×
xtij
ISij(v)(x
t
ij)
, btij = x
t
ij , for x
t
j ∈ Si(xt) and for xtj ∈ S′i(xt), we have, atij = xtij
,btij = ISv(xtj)×
xtij
ISij(v)(x
t
ij)
for xtj ∈ S′′i (xt), atij = xtij and btij = xtij .
We now prove that the process of searching for a better resource allocation described here, leads
to an exact resource allocation.
Theorem 2. The process of obtaining a better efficient resource allocation converges to the exact
resource allocation if at each stage t, it holds that Si(xt) 6= φ and S′i(xt) 6= φ, ∀i ∈ N .
Proof. If at each stage t, Si(xt) 6= φ and Si(xt) 6= φ, ∀i ∈ N , we have var
(
xt+1
)
< var (xt) ∀t ∈ H.
Thus, {var (xt) , t ∈ H} is a strictly decreasing sequence of positive real numbers, H being the
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history.
So ,
lim
t→∞ var
(
xt
)
= 0 = var (x) (17)
for some x ∈ Rn×m∗ such that ∑ni=1 xij = Qj ,∑m∗j=1 xij = Ri. This resource allocation x is then
the exact resource allocation. The existence of this exact resource allocation is ensured by theorem
1.
4 Examples
We illustrate here, our model by means of the same example we mentioned in Introduction. We
first deal with a situation where the mediator searches for solutions using exact resource allocation
strategy, followed by a second one which will have bearings of trade-off strategy.
Example 3. In continuation to what we have discussed in the Introduction, let players P1, P2 and
P3 have resources R1 = 10,R2 = 15 and R3 = 20 respectively (in multiples of hundred thousand
rupees). In phase 1, let the mediator find that only coalitions s1 , s2 and s3 with their budgets as
Q1 = 10 , Q2 = 15 and Q3 = 20 respectively can maximize
∑
v(Qj).
Let us assume hypothetically that players’ satisfaction functions are given by,
IS1j (v) (x) =
x2
100
IS2j (v) (x) =
x2
225
IS3j (v) (x) =
x2
400 ,
for every j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ 3.
The negotiation process goes on as follows:
Stage 1: Let,
x0 =

2.22874 3.37124 4.40002
3.45151 4.93382 6.61467
4.31975 6.69494 8.98531

be the first resource allocation matrix proposed by the mediator. The players will announce their
satisfaction degrees using their investment satisfaction functions as:
[ISij(v)(x
0
ij)] =

0.0496728 0.0505123 0.0484004
0.119129 0.108189 0.109385
0.186602 0.19921 0.201839

so that var
(
x0
)
= 0.356931.
The following table illustrates the iterative steps in obtaining a better rational efficient solution:
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Table 1:
stage t xt = {(xt11, xt21, xt31), (xt12, xt22, xt32), (xt13, xt23, xt33)} var(St)
t = 1 {(2.22874, 3.37124, 4.40002), (3.45151, 4.93382, 6.61467), (4.31975, 6.69494, 8.98531)} 0.0143861
t = 2 {(2.22227, 3.30558, 4.47215), (3.25174, 5.04728, 6.70098), (4.52599, 6.64714, 8.82687)} .0092807
t = 3 {(2.21919, 3.3568, 4.42401), (3.39132, 4.96382, 6.64486), (4.38949, 6.67938, 8.93113)} 0.0067498
t = 4 {(2.22502, 3.31249, 4.46249), (3.29177, 5.02927, 6.67896), (4.48321, 6.65824, 8.85855)} 0.0047768
t = 5 {(2.21809, 3.35228, 4.42963), (3.36388, 4.97582, 6.6603), (4.41803, 6.6719, 8.91007)} 0.00342241
t = 6 {(2.22659, 3.31563, 4.45778), (3.31061, 5.02082, 6.66857), (4.4628, 6.66355, 8.87365)} 0.00301652
t = 7 {(2.21738, 3.3504, 4.43222), (3.35068, 4.98145, 6.66787), (4.43194, 6.66815, 8.89991)} 0.00193378
t = 8 {(2.22719, 3.32024, 4.45257), (3.31982, 5.01231, 6.66787), (4.45299, 6.66745, 8.87956)} 0.00141783
t = 9 {(2.21748, 3.3441, 4.43842), (3.34368, 4.98845, 6.66787), (4.43884, 6.66745, 8.89371)} 0.00108052
t = 10 {(2.22652, 3.32583, 4.44765), (3.3252, 5.00693, 6.66787), (4.44824, 6.66724, 8.88448)} 0.000782514
If all the players agree to a trade-off at var (xt) < 0.0008 then, the corresponding resource al-
location matrix is given by,
S10 =

2.22652 3.32583 4.44765
3.3252 5.00693 6.66787
4.44824 6.66724 8.88448

We take another example but similar to the former, to show that there are situations, where
after certain stage, the exact solution searching strategy would no more be applicable. In such
cases, a trade-off strategy will be adopted. Thus the negotiation protocol becomes a combination
of both the strategies.
Example 4. Consider the same three players P1,P2and P3 who have resources R1 = 10,R2 = 15
and R3 = 20 respectively (in multiples of hundred thousand rupees). Suppose the mediator desires
that the total number of coalitions be 2 (i.e. n = 2). Let these coalitions be s1 and s2 with their
sufficient resources as Q1 = 20 and Q2 = 25 respectively (These may be any two industries we
have proposed in the previous example).
Let us assume hypothetically that players’ satisfaction functions are given by,
IS1j (v) (x) =
x
10
IS2j (v) (x) =
x2
225
IS3j (v) (x) =
x2
400 for j = 1, 2.
The negotiation process goes on as follows:
Stage 1: Let,
x0 =
4 7 4.9
6 8 11

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be the first resource allocation matrix proposed by the mediator. The players would announce
their satisfaction degrees using their investment satisfaction functions as follows:
[ISij(v)(x
0
ij)] =
0.4 0.217778 0.2025
0.6 0.284444 0.3025

where, ISv (x01) = 0.273426 and ISv (x
0
2) = 0.395648. Thus S1(x
0) = {x01,x02} and S′1(x0) = φ.
Therefore, we cannot apply exact resource allocation searching strategy here. So, we can take the
above x0 as a trade-off allocation.
5 conclusion
This paper has presented a dynamic approach to solve the problem of resource allocation among
rational players involved in a joint venture. The problem is treated with fuzzy game theoretic
approach. This work is in sequel to our earlier work on profit allocation [6]. We comment that
a dynamic approach would encourage the players for better performance in anticipation of a
satisfactory resource allocation in a coalition structure. Moreover, if the process of coalition
formation is repeated as the case may be until the players’ resources are exhausted, then intuitively,
they would have sufficient time to learn about each other. Consequently, more synergic gains
would outweigh the one shot expectations which justifies our assumption of rationality regarding
the players’ actual satisfaction functions. This justification is similar to our previous work [6].
Keeping that in mind, here also, we have taken two strategies namely, exact resource allocation
searching and trade-off strategies. Nevertheless, our previous and current works together will
completely describe the dynamics in a cooperative fuzzy game where we have chosen satisfaction
of the players a key ingredient in allocating resource and payoff to a set of players.
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